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Alexander: Innovating Property, reviewing Stuart Banner, American Property:

INNOVATING PROPERTY

Gregory S. Alexander*
STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF How, WHY, AND
WHAT WE OwN (2011). Pp. 355. Cloth. $29.95.

We have never had a synthesis of the history of property in the United States. My
own book, Commodity & Propriety,' was an intellectual history of American legal
thought about property. It did not primarily focus on either legal doctrine or social
changes affecting property. There are chapters on property in both volumes of Morton
Horwitz's Transformation of American Law2 and in Lawrence Friedman's History of
American Law,3 but the coverage of these chapters is very spotty. A comprehensive
synthesis of the history of American property law has been a major gap in American
legal historiography for a very, very long time. But no longer.
Stuart Banner's approach is refreshingly original. Rather than marching through
doctrinal development in a strictly chronological fashion, he focuses on discrete areas of
technological innovation or other exogenous changes resulting in new forms of property
and traces the legal development of property law in response to those innovations. 4
Banner's choices of topics strike me as right on the mark. There are chapters on
intellectual property interests, such as patents in genes5 and copyrights in sound. New
sorts of intellectual property interests are obvious candidates. Everyone recognizes the
novelty of them, and much has already been written about their origins. But Banner's
panorama is far broader. Consider, for example, Banner's chapter on the right of
publicity.7 I cannot think of a better example that illustrates American property law's

* A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 (1997).
2. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 145-67 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) [hereinafter TRANSFORMATION 1870-1960]; MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 31-62, 63-108 (Harvard Univ. Press
1977).
3. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, 167-88, 309-28 (3d ed. 2005).
4. See generally STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF How, WHY, AND WHAT WE
OWN (2011).

5. Id. at 245-56.
6. Id. at 109-29.
7. Id. at 130-61.

307
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2012

1

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 48 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 15
308

TULSA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 48:307

capacity to respond to new social needs and demands by creating new rights. 8 I also
cannot think of a better example of how such rights, innocuous when first created, later
develop over time in ways that threaten the very purposes and goals of its core legal
institutions. The chapter on sound 9 is another coup. Banner's book tells the fascinating
story of how the emergence of various technologies and industries, ranging from music
composition to radio to recording, 10 led to pitched battles over whether to create new
forms of property rights in the largely undeveloped area of copyright law.
I.
I want to begin by situating Banner's book in American legal historiography. The
first point to note is an obvious one, but important nevertheless. The book represents an
unambiguous rejection of the notion of law as an autonomous discipline. To see this,
consider what a book of this sort, a history of American property law, would have looked
like had it been written eighty years ago. Unless it had been written by one of the Legal
Realists,II who in truth constituted a small minority of law professors at the time, it
would have been essentially a doctrinal history - a chronology of the development of
major legal doctrines. There would have been little or no mention of social or economic
changes, no use of the tools of economic analysis, no discussion of the general
intellectual milieu within which new legal doctrines emerged. The story that would have
been told is law as a black box, legal doctrines and rules developing through law's own
internal logic with abstract concepts driving legal development. I exaggerate a bit here,
of course, but not much. For, compared with legal change as Banner describes it, to the
legal scholars of the early twentieth century law really was a black box. Not so for
Banner. Throughout his book, legal changes, both in norms and in concepts, are
responses to exogenous changes in society, economy, and perhaps most importantly,
technology.12 For Banner, law is epiphenomenal, responsive rather than effecting.13 This
leads to my second historiographical point, for this understanding of law and legal
change places Banner well within the tradition of American legal historiography that we
have come to call "Hurstian."l4
Banner's book has all of the hallmarks that we associate with the socio-legal
approach to legal history that was first developed by the great Willard Hurst and later
15
continued by his disciples at the University of Wisconsin, notably Lawrence Friedman.
Hurst himself best expressed the view of law that guided this genre of legal history,

8. See id. at 139 (describing the emergence of the right to privacy).
9. See id at 109-29.
10. See id. at 202-19.
11. For a discussion of the definition and origins of legal realism, see TRANSFORMATION 1870-1960, supra
note 2, at 169-92.
12. BANNER, supranote 4, at 2.
13. Id. at 3.
14. See, e.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTHCENTURY UNITED STATES (1956).
15. See generally Robert W. Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in
American Legal Historiography,10 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 9 (1975) (providing an overview of Hurst's impact on
American legal history); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 3.
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stating, "[i]n the interaction of law and American life the law was passive, acted upon by
other social forces, more often than acting upon them." 1 6 Hurst stressed, as William
Novak wrote, the "interplay of law and social growth" and "law's operational ties to
other components of social order."1 7 All this is equally true of Banner's book. But
Banner doesn't stop there. His book is not merely Hurstian. I think it represents the next
generation in the Hurstian tradition - not a break with that tradition but an extension of
it in ways that none of its previous practitioners, even the greatest of them, had imagined.
The great agent of change here is technology. There is nothing new in that, of
course; consider the role of railroads in the development of tort doctrine in the familiar
Hurstian story.18 But Banner places technological change front and center in
unmistakable ways, including organizing chapters around emergent technologies and the
industries they spawned. For example, in chapter six, we learn how the development of
sound technology beginning in the late nineteenth century prompted major changes in
intellectual property law, such that sound could now legally be property.19 In true
Hurstian style, Banner tells the story of how the struggle over property rights in sound
pitted various players in the music and recording industries - composers and publishers
against manufacturers of player pianos and phonographs, 20 everyone driven by selfinterest. More often than not, the law that emerged from such epic struggles was some
sort of compromise of interests, struck in such a way as to assure that emerging
technologies and industries would not be stifled but at the same time creating incentives
for artists to continue to add to a young but already rich American culture.
Banner extends the Hurstian tradition in a second way as well. Although Hurst and
his followers, such as Lawrence Friedman, certainly paid attention to economic
conditions and their effects on the law, their understanding and analysis of economics
was pretty rudimentary. The same certainly cannot be said of Stuart Banner. In previous
books Banner displayed more than passing familiarity with microeconomic theory. In his
masterful book Possessing the Pacific,21 for example, we hear of monopsonies, bilateral
monopolies, and transaction costs, all used in ways that immensely illuminated the
complex story of two radically different land systems coming into conflict in colonial
New Zealand.22 Similarly, in his current book, Banner uses the tools of economics to
shed light on a variety of topics ranging from patents23 to broadcasting.24

JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 4 (1950).
17. William J. Novak, Law, Capitalism and the Liberal State: The Historical Sociology of James Willard
Hurst, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 99 (2000) (quoting James Willard Hurst, The Law in UnitedStates History, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 518, 521 (1960)).
18. See HURST, supra note 14, at 23.
19. BANNER, supra note 4, at 111.
20. Id. at 111-15.
16.

21. STUART BANNER, POSSESSING THE PACIFIC: LAND,
AUSTRALIA TO ALASKA (2007).

SETTLERS, AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE FROM

22. Id. at 52-127.
23. BANNER, supra note 4, at 24-28.
24. Id. at 215-19.
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11. QUESTIONS AND CRITICISMS
One uncertainty with which the book left me is Banner's conception of property.
Banner states in the introduction that the "basic message of the book is that our ideas
about property have always been contested and have always been in flux."25 I have no
quarrel whatsoever with that message; indeed, that was essentially the thesis of my own
1997 book.26 But, I want to look at how Banner develops that message to see if he gives
a clear understanding of property.
The way to do that is once again to compare his book with the work of Hurstian
legal historians.
James Willard Hurst had a very clear conception of property which was abundantly
evident in his canonical book Law and the Conditions of Freedom.27 In that book Hurst
told the story of the development of American property law as a conflict between two
competing conceptions, one static and anti-developmental, the other dynamic and
aggressively pro-development.28 The book described how the conflict between these two
conceptions played throughout American history in various contexts and how property
law in the nineteenth century developed in such a way that permitted a "release of
energy"29 in the young American economy. Although his followers did not always share
this essentially benign, even legitimating view of property's legal development, they
certainly did share his understanding of property as strictly instrumental. This
instrumental view fits squarely with the reason for his interest in property, which they
also share: property is and has been throughout American history the locus for conflicts
between interest groups in the economy. Now, as I have already indicated, Banner
certainly shares with Hurstians the vision of property as a mis-en-schne of interest-group
conflicts. But does he share with them their undilutedly instrumental conception of
property? I wish that he had said something more along these lines, perhaps even
referring to Hurst's own book.
This leads to a second shortcoming, at least as I see it - the book's silence
regarding its position in the existing corpus of historical writing on American property
law. Banner does not tell us how he situates the book among other leading historical
analyses of American property law. How, for example, does his view compare with
Horwitz's treatments of property in the two volumes of The Transformations of
American Law?30 His silence regarding my book is understandable given the fact that we
had very different objectives; our two books are really apples and oranges. But Horwitz's
treatment of property has enough in common with Banner's to enable a very interesting
comparison between them.
Turning to some specific points, I want to take up first his claim that the "bundleof-rights" conception of property,31 - which Banner correctly claims originated in the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 3.
See ALEXANDER, supranote 1, at 15-16.
HURST, supra note 14.
Id. at 23-29.
Id. at 75.
See sources cited, supranote 2.
BANNER, supra note 4, at 63.
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late nineteenth century, not, as is common thought, with the Legal Realists - facilitated
a reinterpretation of the takings clause in a much more property-protective direction than
had previously been the case.32 I do not challenge the assertion that the reconception of
property had that effect, but I wish that Banner had discussed the very ambiguous nature
of the bundles-of-rights conception. Consider, for example, the fact that Legal Realists
like Hohfeld's colleague and admirer, Arthur Corbin, whose politics were strongly proregulatory, were quick to endorse and pick up the bundles conception. Banner notes
this, 34 but he does not discuss how the same idea could be used to virtually opposite
effects by different groups of jurists. They were able to do so, I suggest, because the
bundles conception was ambiguous (in multiple respects) and could be manipulated for
politically diverse, even opposing ends. 35 Banner's discussion of the origins and
development of the bundles conception would have been stronger, in my view, had he
extended it to its later use by the Legal Realists, who gave it a very different political
valence.
A second topic that, in my judgment, merited a deeper analysis was the so-called
"New Property."36 Banner devotes an entire chapter to the topic,37 but there is no
discussion about the very strong theoretical and conceptual criticisms leveled at Charles
Reich's thesis. For example, the late Jim Harris pointed out that Reich's justificatoryanalogy argument raises many problems.38 Suppose, for example, that one rejects
Reich's premise that the justification for private property lies in personal
independence. 39 What, then, follows regarding the legal treatment of government
largesse? 40 Moreover, Banner is silent about the failure of efforts to create anything
resembling substantive property-related socio-economic rights. After all, Reich only
sought to gain procedural due process protection for government largesse through his
"New Property" theory.41 In cases like Lindsey v. Normet42 and San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,43 the stakes were even greater - petitioners
sought constitutional recognition of substantive socio-economic rights, specifically
housing and education rights. 44 These efforts were squarely rejected and, as a result, this
country has never had a scheme of constitutional welfare rights, although some of our
32. Id. at 63-72.
33. See Arthur L. Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 YALE L.J. 501, 509 (1924).
34. BANNER, supranote 4, at 72.

35. Consider, for example, the fact that today although some strongly pro-property rights scholars oppose
the bundles-of-rights conception, others endorse it. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened
to Property in Law and Economics?, I11 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001) (opposing the bundle-of-rights view and
describing the growing sentiment "that property is simply a list of use rights in particular resources"); but see
Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheersfor Merrill and Smith, 8
ECON. J. WATCH 215, 216 (2011) (endorsing the bundle-of-sticks metaphor).
36. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
37. BANNER, supra note 4, at 220-37.
38. J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 151 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996).

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Reich, supranote 36, at 771-74.
See HARRIS, supra note 38, at 151.
See Reich, supra note 36, at 739-42.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 4-6; Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 58.
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greatest constitutional property commentators, such as Frank Michelman, have made
strong attempts to achieve that goal.4 5 In my view, this development is an important
chapter in the story of the development of American constitutional property in the second
half of the twentieth century.
My final comment is that I think the book would have benefitted from more
welfare economics. There is a very real sense Banner's approach follows, or at least is
compatible with, that of Harold Demsetz's famous article Toward a Theory of Property
Rights.46 You will recall in that article Demsetz argued that what generates the creation
of private property rights is the emergence of new technologies or new markets, which
alter the cost-benefit calculus in such a way as to make it worthwhile, i.e., wealthmaximizing, to create new property rights in resources that were previously held in
common.47 Similarly, Banner focuses on how the emergence of new technologies led to
the creation of new property rights. 4 8 But he has little or nothing to say about the costs
involved in these developments, and surely they were not negligible. Demsetz illustrated
his thesis in the simplest of settings - a setting that bears no resemblance to the
complex environments in which emergent twentieth and twenty-first century
technologies have spawned more sophisticated intellectual property rights. The
development of radio or the recording industry would have been far more interesting
contexts in which to examine the cost-benefit dynamics of creating new property rights,
even if only superficially. But, to be fair to Banner, as he himself states in the book's
introduction, "[t]he full history of property is so broad that it cannot be encompassed in a
single book. There is plenty of room for more." 49 So, I am waiting for Banner's next
one.

45. Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L.
REv. 1319 (1987).
46. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
47. Id. at 350.
48. BANNER, supranote 4, at 2-3.
49. Id. at 3.
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